Lebanon’s trade deficit reached $17.44 billion in 2025

A data page that summarizes the contradictions of the Lebanese economy

The « Economic Indicators / Capital Markets » page of the document offers one of the most telling condensations of the Lebanese situation. It brings together external trade, balance of payments, offset cheques, airport traffic, inflation, Bank of Lebanon reserves, bank assets, private deposits, money supply, interest rates, private sector credit, Beirut Stock Exchange activity and sovereign euro bond prices on a single page. This juxtaposition is valuable because it shows that no single indicator is enough to tell Lebanon. In 2025, there were signs of respite, including the slowdown in inflation, the resumption of airport traffic and the magnitude of the balance of payments surplus. But these improvements coexist with a much heavier trade deficit, a further decline in private deposits, a contraction in bank credit and a sharp decline in market capitalization.

The main teaching on this page is therefore not that of a clear correction, nor that of a uniform collapse. It is that of an economy that continues to function, but in a very unbalanced framework, where the points of improvement remain fragile, often partial, and above all unable to correct structural weaknesses.

External trade remains the core of the problem

Merchandise exports reached $3.639 billion in 2025, up from $2.707 billion in 2024 and $2.995 billion in 2023. This represents an annual increase of 34.4%. At the same time, imports amounted to $21.076 billion in 2025, up from $16.902 billion in 2024 and $17.524 billion in 2023, an increase of 24.7% over one year. The trade deficit thus increased to $17.436 billion, after $14.195 billion in 2024 and $14.529 billion in 2023, representing a deterioration of 22.8% in 2025. In December 2025 alone, exports reached $430 million, imports $1.698 billion and the monthly trade deficit $1.268 billion.

These figures must be read carefully. Export growth is real and even strong. But it is far from enough to compensate for the surge in imports. Lebanon continues to import almost six times more than it exports. The central economic problem is therefore not the total absence of a rebound in exports; This is the huge gap between a limited export base and an ever massive external dependence.

The table of ratios published later in the document reinforces this reading. The export-to-import ratio rose from 18.3% in 2022 to 17.1% in 2023 and to 16% in 2024 estimated. The ratio of the trade deficit to GDP increased from 72.8% in 2022 to 46% in 2023 and to 37.5% in 2024 estimated. This relative improvement in the weight of the deficit in GDP does not obviate the fundamental fact that the Lebanese economy remains highly dependent on imported goods, inputs and energy, even though its capacity to sell abroad remains narrow.

Balance of payments sends a strong but ambiguous signal

The balance of payments recorded a surplus of $19.561 billion in 2025, after $6.44 billion in 2024 and $1.143 billion in 2023. The document also indicates a deficit of $790 million in December 2024, followed by a surplus of $1.5 billion in November 2025 and $2.2318 billion in December 2025. The annual increase of 2025 is thus 203.7%.

Taken in isolation, this figure may give the impression of a dramatic improvement in the country’s external position. But the analysis must be more careful. On the one hand, the same number specifies that the net external assets of the financial sector increased by $5.74 billion in January 2026, mainly as a result of an increase of 5.5 billion in the value of the Bank of Lebanon’s gold reserves and 392.4 million in its foreign reserves. It also recalls that the Bank of Lebanon has changed the scope of its external assets in the context of a methodology aligned with the IMF.

On the other hand, a surplus balance of payments does not cancel a massive trade deficit. It means that other flows offset this deficit, at least temporarily. In the Lebanese case, however, an economy that has to offset a trade hole of $17.436 billion by financial movements, bank flows, reserves, asset revaluations or external transfers remains vulnerable. The criticism here is simple: the balance of payments surplus is an important indicator, but it cannot be read as proof of productive rebalancing.

The slowdown in inflation is the most tangible signal of 2025

The consumer price index grew on average by 14.6% in 2025, compared with 45.2% in 2024 and 221.3% in 2023. The national accounts table also points out that average inflation had already reached 171.2% in 2022. On a monthly basis in the table, the index posted rose from 18.1 in December 2024 to 14.7 in November 2025 and to 12.2 in December 2025.

This deceleration in inflation is one of the few frankly positive signals on the page. Increasing from more than 221% to 45.2% and then to 14.6% represents a major change in diet. But this slowdown should not be confused with a return to price stability. Inflation of 14.6% remains high. Above all, it comes after several years of booming prices, distortion of income, destruction of savings and disruption of consumption benchmarks.

The document also recalls that the average official exchange rate increased from £1,507.5 per dollar in 2022 to 15,000 in 2023 and then to 89,500 in 2024, while the average parallel rate reached £89,700 in 2024, very close to the average weighted rate. This means that the observed disinflation does not fit into a normal economy, but into an economy that has already absorbed a massive depreciation of its currency.

Airport traffic confirms partial recovery in traffic economy

The number of passengers at the airport reached 7,010,580 in 2025, after 5,624,402 in 2024, an increase of 24.6%. This level remains slightly lower than that of 2023, which amounted to 7,103,349 passengers. For December alone, traffic increased from 379,910 passengers in December 2024 to 594,705 in December 2025, after 467,099 in November 2025.

This rebound is economically significant. It refers to the resumption of travel, visits to the diaspora, tourism, business travel and flows of services. But we must avoid seeing it as a solid basis for growth. The same number indicates that the Institute of International Finance believes that intensifying regional hostilities would depress tourism and disrupt air transport. The airport is therefore both an economic breathing indicator and a point of extreme sensitivity.

Cheques offset show less intermediated economy

Cheques in Lebanese pounds totalled $702 million equivalent in 2025, compared to $877 million in 2024 and $754 million in 2023, down 20% over one year. Cheques cleared in foreign currency amounted to $706 million, compared to $1.299 billion in 2024 and $3.292 billion in 2023, a fall of 45.7%. The total netted cheques stood at $1.408 billion in 2025, down from $2.176 billion in 2024 and 4.046 billion in 2023, a contraction of 35.3%. The document states that these figures do not include cheques cleared in fresh currency.

This continuous decline is very revealing. It says something about the profound transformation of monetary and banking practices. The regression of cheques should not only be read as a technical detail. It points to an economy where traditional settlement instruments lose their centrality, where confidence in traditional channels remains weak, and where an increasing share of trade is done differently, outside the banking channels that previously structured part of economic life.

Banks remain voluminous, but their economic function remains weakened

Bank assets amounted to $102.30 billion at the end of December 2025, compared to $103.15 billion a year earlier, a decrease of 0.8%. Private sector deposits fell to $87.19 billion, down from $88.65 billion in December 2024, down 1.6%. Money supply M2 rose from 1.46 billion to 1.68 billion, up 14.5%, while M3 fell from 69.26 billion to 67.29 billion, down 2.8%. The book debit rate rose from 5.61% to 10.90%, the book credit rate from 3.58% to 3.68%, the dollar debit rate from 3.70% to 3.68% and the dollar credit rate from 0.03% to 0.09%. Finally, bank loans to the private sector fell from $5.95 billion to $5.20 billion, a decrease of 12.5% in 2025.

Taken together, these figures show a banking system that remains immense in size, but weakened in its financing capacity. Private deposits are still falling. Credit to the private sector is clearly contracting. The increase in the borrowing rate in pounds increases the apparent cost of local credit. The increase in M2, combined with the fall in M3, also underlines a recomposition of liquidity which does not reflect an orderly return to banking intermediation.

The document on page 10 continues this observation. It shows that by the end of January 2026, foreign currency loans to the private sector had decreased by $36 billion since the beginning of 2019, a fall of 87.6%, while loans in pounds had declined by 60.2% over the same period. In addition, the dollarization rate for private loans was 97.7% at the end of January 2026. This is not directly related to page 2, but is a strong indication of the $5.20 billion in private loans at the end of 2025: Lebanese bank credit has become both low, concentrated and almost entirely dollarized.

Beirut Stock Exchange remains narrow and concentrated

On the week of March 2 to 6, 2026, 183,526 shares were exchanged, compared to 388,334 the previous week, a weekly decrease of 52.7%. The value of trade reached $1,211,012, after $2,754,959 the previous week, down 56%. Market capitalization stood at $18.59 billion, down from $18.94 billion a week earlier, a decrease of 1.9%. On a monthly basis, the capitalization of February 2026 was $18.94 billion, compared to $24.45 billion in February 2025, a decrease of 22.5%. On the other hand, the total volume exchanged in February 2026 reached 872,907 securities, up 8.9% over one year, and the total value exchanged 27,119 million dollars, up 20.8%.

This combination deserves attention. Trade increases over a year, but the overall market value declines sharply. This means that trading activity does not translate into an increase in the overall market. In other words, the stock exchange can remain lively, without reflecting a profound improvement in confidence or prospects for the listed economy.

The market structure accentuates this reading. Solidere A represents 40.9% of total capitalization, while Solidere B weighs 24.5%. These two lines alone therefore concentrate more than 65% of the capitalization of the square. BLOM Listed represents 8.6%, HOLCIM 7.3%, Audi Listed 4.7% and BLOM GDR 2.8%. In volume, the most traded value over the week was Byblos Common with 149,694 titles and a 9.8% increase in the price to $0.67.

This concentration is essential for any critical reading. The Beirut Stock Exchange provides useful prices and signals, but it only reflects a small fraction of the economy. When two real estate lines dominate capitalization at this point, the market place becomes a partial barometer, very sensitive to a few titles, and insufficient in itself to represent the health of the Lebanese productive fabric.

Euro-sovereign bonds continue to signal deep mistrust

The table of sovereign eurobonds shows a median price of 30.5 cents of the dollar for all the listed maturities, from November 2026 to March 2037. Median yields range from 259.43% for November 2026 to 11.05% for March 2037. Other maturities include 154.73% for March 2027, 50.28% for November 2028, 32.34% for February 2030 and 17.23% for May 2033.

The market message is clear. A sovereign whose bonds are traded around 30.5 cents of the dollar is not considered to be financial under normal conditions. The rating table in the document confirms this reality: Moodys ranks sovereign debt in C currencies with a stable perspective, S&P Global Ratings displays SD or CCC+ according to currency and maturity, and Fitch had withdrawn its rating in July 2024 after indicating RD.

Summary table of main indicators

Source: Bank of Lebanon, Ministry of Finance, Central Statistical Administration, Beirut Stock Exchange, LSEG Workspace, Byblos Research.

The strength of this picture is to make the Lebanese paradox visible. Inflation is slowing down, air traffic is returning and the balance of payments is improving considerably. At the same time, however, foreign trade is becoming more disequilibrium, credit is shrinking, private deposits are declining and the value of the equity market is falling sharply. It is therefore not a homogeneous recovery, but an economy that survives thanks to a few pockets of stabilization in the midst of persistent imbalances.

The institutions that structure this reading

The Bank of Lebanon is the source of monetary, banking and reserve data. The Department of Finance feeds the budget data. The Central Statistical Office provides price indicators. The Beirut Stock Exchange is the institution of the equity market, while LSEG Workspace provides the prices and returns of Eurobonds. Byblos Research aggregates these sources in a single weekly reading, which allows for dialogue between trade, inflation, banks and financial markets on a single page.

This institutional intersection is useful, as it shows that Lebanon is not lacking only in growth. Above all, it suffers from a weak structure: a narrow productive base, a very heavy commercial dependence, a banking system that no longer fully fulfils its financing function, a concentrated stock market, and a sovereign who is always penalized by a high level of distrust. The numbers of 2025 do not tell us a way out of the crisis. They tell of an economy that still stands, but with narrow, uneven and fragile supports.